Unilateral Disengagement – Is the last option an option at all?
In 2005, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the State of Israel took the decision to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip, removing all military installations and positions, as well as physically removing the 8,000 settlers who had made the Strip their home. In a heart-wrenching period, in which some of the great divisions of Israeli society were brought into the painful light of day, Israel moved from a position of complete control and great strength to push the Palestinians into assuming responsibility for the territory they claim. It was a bold move, designed to kick-start negotiations and to persuade the Palestinians that the Israeli leadership was prepared to give up land for peace.

Gaza resident being forcefully evacuated
The result of this move is now well known. Within 18 months, the terrorists of Hamas had taken over the Gaza Strip, executing their political opponents, imposing their Islamist agenda and firing thousands of rockets into Southern Israel. The rise of Hamas in Gaza brought around 1.1 million Israelis within range of rockets, and forever changed the nature of the communities that are within the possible kill-zone for the worse. Today, the towns and villages of the South are equipped with bomb shelters where families are forced to cower with their children, as terrorist elements fire indiscriminately into their gardens, homes and schools. Thankfully, the IDF has acted proactively to defend Israeli citizens, both with airstrikes against terrorist infrastructure and the introduction of the Iron Dome defensive measures. This has reduced but far from extinguished the terrorist threat against the South. In the last 10 days, school has been cancelled and families have been forced to spend days on end hiding in their bomb shelters.
Of course, Israel has previously engaged in land operations in the Gaza Strip. From December 2008 to January 2009 Israel reacted to vicious terrorist provocation to bring the South back to a peaceful settlement through an extensive bombing campaign and ground incursion. The resulting victory greatly undermined the terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and successfully re-established the concept of deterrence in the minds of the Hamas leadership.

IDF in Gaza, January 2009
Since Operation Cast Lead, skirmishes have continued along the Southern border, leading to the recent unleashing of hundreds of rockets on Israeli cities. After Israel moved to disrupt an active terrorist operation by using a targeted airstrike to kill the mastermind of the plan, Hamas and other terrorist groups unleashed a barrage of rockets (at least 230), aiming for Israeli civilians and population centers. Only a robust air campaign by the IAF has persuaded the terrorists not to seek a full engagement with the Israelis. The response has been restrained and highly effective, and should serve as a model for all Israeli actions in the South.
But what of the major questions and policy that brought about the withdrawal from Gaza? Unilateral disengagement by the Israelis from areas they have no intention of keeping as part of Israel is often held up as the obvious course of action. It is argued by many, including this forum on several occasions, that if the Israelis withdrew completely from large swathes of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority would have no choice but to assume responsibility for those territories and cease to complain about how the occupation undermines their government. It is time to accept that those of us who have called for such a unilateral disengagement have done so using short-sighted reasoning. It is clearly not the course of action that Israel can take at this point in time.
A few months ago I would have advocated the following moves by the Israeli government so as to secure their citizens, reduce the strain on the IDF, and re-establish their moral authority in the Territories:
1. Immediate disengagement from all ‘outposts’ (settlements with fewer than 1,000 residents). These are largely ideologically extreme youths seeking to expand the State of Israel in an unhelpful and militarily unsustainable way.
2. Active prevention of the establishment of more ‘outposts’.
3. Reduction of IDF positions in non-populated areas, primarily leaving IDF personnel only around the remaining settlements, and key positions along the West Bank of the River Jordan.
4. Dismantling of the very few remaining checkpoints that exist between Palestinian towns, with an increase in security along all checkpoints leading from the Territories into the State of Israel.
5. A review on a case by case basis of all remaining settlements under 10,000 people, and after evaluating their strategic position (particularly proximity to the Green Line / other major settlements), either maintenance of security or disengagement process of 3 – 6 months by which time such settlements must be evacuated.
6. An unambiguous statement that settlements with populations over 10,000 people, settlements found within Gush Etzion, Hebron or within the boundaries of natural growth of existing major settlements, will not be evacuated and steps taken to formally strengthen the ties between them and the rest of Israel.
Today, having considered the potential effect this could have on Israeli security, key revisions are needed.
Points 1, 2 and 4 remain national security imperatives for the State of Israel.
Point 3 while still desirable, might lead to a military power vacuum which could encourage Gaza-style terrorism. Having missiles launched from the West Bank would bring the entirety of Israel within range of missiles. The catastrophic effect of that violence in the South cannot be understated, thus to extend a zone of fear to every Israeli home would be completely unacceptable. Having visited a private home in the South of Israel, and seen the way that a mother has to grab her children and sprint for the bomb-shelter sometimes several times a day, it is clear to this commentator that to subject all Israelis to such a position would constitute nothing less than a moral crime.
It is Points 5 and 6 – which are closely connected – that are now very much in doubt. If Israel took steps to tear down relatively large settlements which I still argue are unsustainable in the long-run right now, it would invite on itself another campaign of violence on the part of the Palestinians. Israel could have no guarantees that groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas would not immediately fill the vacuum and launch rockets from just a few miles from the Knesset building. Israel will not tolerate such a situation, and currently withdrawing from the territories I have described could well provoke such a course of events.
What reasonable person can deny that Israel risks opening itself up to extensive rocket attack if it took the unilateral disengagement steps it previously did in Gaza?
The definition of insanity is to repeat the same action again and again, expecting a different result. Israel has shown that all it gets for unsolicited compromise and withdrawal is violence; this was the case in Gaza, and the outposts dismantled in the West Bank. Israel has enough security threats now without adding another, potentially unlimited territory from which terrorists could operate with impunity and threaten the lives of Israeli families.
No, unilateral disengagement is no longer an acceptable or viable route. Anyone who continues to advocate for it shows a callous disregard for the safety and survival of Israeli citizens, and the State of Israel itself.


















